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Halting a computer or biological virus outbreak requires a detailed understanding of the timing of the inter-
actions between susceptible and infected individuals. For example, the spread of email viruses and worms is
driven by the email communication and computer usage patterns of individuals. While current spreading mod-
els assume that users interact uniformly in time, following a Poisson process, a series of recent measurements
indicate that the inter-contact time distribution is heavy tailed, corresponding to a temporally inhomogeneous
bursty contact process. Here we show that the non-Poisson nature of the contact dynamics results in prevalence
decay times significantly larger than predicted by the standard Poisson process based models. Our predictions
are in agreement with the detailed time resolved prevalence data of computer viruses, which, according to virus
bulletins, show a decay time close to a year, in contrast with the one day decay predicted by the standard Poisson
process based models.
Introdution
The battle against computer viruses and worms dates back
to the dawn of electronic communications. According to The
WildList Organization International (www.wildlist.org) there
were 130 known computer viruses in 1993, a number that has
exploded to 4,767 in April 2006. With the proliferation of
broadband “always on” connections, file downloads, instant
messaging, Bluetooth-enabled mobile devices and other com-
munications technologies the mechanisms used by worms and
viruses to spread have evolved as well. Still, most viruses con-
tinue to spread through email attachments. Indeed, according
to the Virus Bulletin (www.virusbtn.com), the Email worms
W32/Netsky.h and W32/Mytob with the ability to spread it-
self through email, account for 70% of the virus prevalences
in April 2006. When the worm infects a machine, it sends and
infected email to all addresses in the computer’s email address
book. This self-broadcast mechanism allows for the worm’s
rapid reproduction and spread, explaining why email worms
continue to be the main security threat.
In order to eradicate viruses, as well as to control and limit
the impact of an outbreak, we need to have a detailed and
quantitative understanding of the spreading dynamics. This
is currently provided by a wide range of epidemic models,
each adopted to the particular realities of the computer based
spreading process. A common feauture of all current epidemic
models [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] is the assumption that the contact
process between individuals follows Poisson statistics, mean-
ing that the probability that an agent interacts with another
agent in a dt time interval is dt/〈τ〉, where 〈τ〉 is the mean
inter-event time. Furthermore, the time τ between two con-
secutive contacts is predicted to follow an exponential distri-
bution with mean 〈τ〉. Therefore, reports of new infections
should decay exponentially with a decay time of about a day,
or at most a few days [1, 2, 3, 4, 5], given that most users
check their emails on a daily basics, providing 〈τ〉 of ap-
proximatelly a few days (see below). In contrast, prevalence
records indicate that new infections are still reported years af-
ter the release of antiviruses (http://www.virusbtn.com,[1, 9]),
and their decay time is in the vicinity of years, two-three or-
ders of magnitude larger than the Poisson process predicted
decay times. Late infection reports are generally perceived
as a consequence of the lack of discipline among email users
which are unaware of the new viruses, or do not take any ac-
tion after the report of a new email worm. Yet, the time scale
characterizing these late infections, ranging from months to
years, are in contradiction with the email activity measure-
ments indicating daily email access, as well as the prediction
of current epidemic models.
A possible resolution of this discrepancy may be rooted
in the failure of the Poisson approximation for the inter-
event time distribution, currently used in all modeling frame-
works. Indeed, recent studies of email exchange records be-
tween individuals in a university environment have shown
that the probability density function P (τ) of the time inter-
val τ between two consecutive emails sent by the same user
is well approximated by a fat tailed distribution P (τ) ∼ τ−1
[10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. In the following we provide evidence
that this deviation from the Poisson process has a strong im-
pact on the email worm’s spread, offering a coherent expla-
nation of the anomalously long prevalence times observed for
email viruses.
Results
Email activity patterns: The contact dynamics responsible
for the spread of email worms is driven by the email com-
munication and usage patterns of individuals. To character-
ize these patterns we studied two email datasets. The first
dataset contains emails from a university environment, cap-
turing the communication pattern between 3,188 users, con-
sisting on 129,135 emails [10]. The second dataset contains
emails from a commercial provider (freemail.hu) spanning ten
months, 1,729,165 users and 39,046,030 emails. In this sec-


























































FIG. 1: Distribution P (τ ) of the inter-event time between two con-
secutive emails sent by an email user. The left and right panels repre-
sent the university and commercial datasets, respectively. (a) and (b)
Log-log plot of P (τ ) for different time window sizes T as indicated
by the legend. Note that the cutoff shifts to the right with increasing
time window T . (c) and (d) The same plots after removing the fi-
nite time window effects, the data collapsing into a single curve. The
solid line represents the power law decay P (τ ) ∼ τ−1. (e) and (f)
Semi-long plot emphasizing the exponential decay at large τ , for the
largest time window T . The solid lines are fit to an exponential decay
τP (τ ) ∼ e−τ/τE resulting in τE = 25 ± 2 days and 9 ± 1 months
for the university (e) and commercial (f) datasets, respectively. The
outlayer in (f) was excluded when fitting to an exponential decay.
tion we focus on the properties of the inter-event probability
density function P (τ), giving the probability density that the
time interval between two consecutive emails sent by the same
user equals τ .
Figure 1 shows different properties of P (τ) for the two
email datasets. In general, P (τ) is rather broad, following ap-
proximately a power law with exponent α ≈ 1 and a cutoff at
large τ values. Most important, the value of the cutoff depends
on the time window T over which the data has been recorded
(Fig. 1a,b). By restricting the data to varying time windows
we find that P (τ) goes to zero as 1− τ/T when τ approaches
T . After correcting for the finiteness of the observation time
window we obtain that the distributions for different T values
collapse into a single curve (Fig. 1c,d), representing the true
inter-event time distribution. The obtained P (τ) is well ap-
proximated by a power law decay followed by an exponential









where A is a normalization factor. The power law decay at
small and intermediate τ is clearly manifested on the log-log
plot of P (τ) (Fig. 1c,d), consistent with α ≈ 1, spanning over
four (Fig. 1c) to six (Fig. 1d) decades. The exponential cutoff
is best seen in a semi-log plot after removing the power law
decay (Fig. 1e,f), resulting in a decay time τE = 25± 2 days
and τE = 9 ± 1 months for the university and commercial












where 〈τ〉 is the mean inter-event time, taking the values 0.86
and 4.9 days for the university and commercial data, respec-
tively. Equation (2) implies that the consecutive interaction
events are separated by relatively uniform time intervals 〈τ〉
and long delays between two contacts are exponentially rare
beyond 〈τ〉. In contrast, the power law in (1) indicates that
the vast majority of contacts take place in bursts consisting
of a rapid succession of emails separated by long delays of
no email activity [12, 13, 15]. Therefore, in contrast with the
homogeneous contact patterns used in current epidemic mod-
els the email data display a heterogeneous intermittent pat-
tern, with short bursts of activity separated by long periods of
silence. As we show next, this bursty activity pattern has a
profound impact on the spreading dynamics.
The dynamics of worm spreading: To investigate the im-
pact of the observed non-Poisson activity patterns on spread-
ing processes we study the spread of email worms among
email users. For the moment we ignore the possibility that
some users may delete the infected email or may have in-
stalled the worm antivirus and therefore do not participate in
the spreading process, to return later at the possible impact of
these events on our predictions. Therefore, the spreading pro-
cess is well described by the susceptible-infected (SI) model
on the email network.
The spreading dynamics is jointly determined by the email
activity patterns and the topology of the corresponding email
communication network [10, 17]. The email activity patterns
are reflected in the infection generation times, where the gen-
eration time is defined as the time interval between the infec-
tion of the primary case (the user sending the email) and the
infection of a secondary case (a different user opening the re-
ceived infected email). From the perspective of the secondary
case, the time when a user receives the infected email is ran-
dom and the generation time is the time interval between ar-
rival and the opening of the infected email. In most cases
received emails are responded in the next email activity burst
[10, 13], and viruses are acting when emails are read, approxi-
3matelly the same time when the next bunch of emails are writ-
ten. Therefore the generation time can be approximated by the
time interval between the arrival of a virus infected email, and
the next email sent to any recipient by the secondary case.
If we model the email activity pattern as a renewal process
[16] with inter-event time distribution P (τ) then the genera-
tion time is the residual waiting time and is characterized by







P (τ) . (3)












i.e. the generation time distribution is exponential and its de-
cay coincides with the decay of the inter-event time distribu-
tion. For the renewal process with inter-event time distribution
(1) we instead obtain







where f(τ) decays slower than any exponential function for
τ →∞. Thus, as for the Poisson approximation, the real gen-
erating time distribution exhibits an exponential decay. The
difference is, however, that the decay time τE now corre-
sponds to the cutoff of the inter-event time distribution, which
is much larger than the average inter-event time 〈τ〉 predicted
by the Poisson approximation (4). This significant difference
is rooted on the initial slow decay of the inter-event time dis-
tribution, pushing the largest inter-event times, corresponding
to occasional long delays between consecutive emails, to time
scales far beyond the average inter-event time.
As a next step we aim to determine the average number
of new infections n(t) at time t resulting from an outbreak
starting from a single infected user at t = 0. Although the
email network contain cycles, it is a very sparse network, thus
we approximate it by a tree-like structure. Previous analytical
studies have shown that this approximation captures the main
features of the spreading dynamics on real networks [1, 18].






where zd is the average number of users d email contacts away
from the first infected user, D is the maximum of d and g⋆d(t)
is the d-order convolution of g(τ)
g⋆d(t) =
{
g(t) , for d = 1∫
t
0
dτg(τ)g⋆d−1(t− τ) , for d > 1
(7)
representing the probability density function of the sum of d
generation times. Substituting (4) and (5) into (6) we obtain










〈τ〉 , Poisson approx.




















⋆d(t) , Email data .
(10)
In the long time limit n(t) (8) is dominated by the exponen-
tial decay while F (t) gives just a correction. The decay time
(9) is, however, significantly different for the Poisson approx-
imation and the real inter-event time distribution. In essence,
our calculations predict that the long term decay in the num-
ber of infected individuals is controlled by the average inter-
event time in the case of the Poisson approximation, which for
emails is of the order of magnitude of a few days, given that
most email users check their emails on a daily basis. In con-
trast, for a non-Poisson inter-event time distribution the decay
time is controlled by the timescale characterizing the expo-
nential cutoff in the inter-event time distribution, which is of
the order of the longest observed times with no email activ-
ity for a selected user. Such timeframes of no email activity
can often span several months, as our measurements on the
commercial database indicates.
To test these predictions we perform numerical simulations
using the detailed email communication history recorded by
the email activity measurements. In this case a susceptible
user receiving an infected email at time t becomes infected
and sends an infected email to all its email contacts at t′ > t,
where t′ is the time he/she sends an email for the first time af-
ter infection, as documented in the real email data. To reduce
the computational cost we focus our analysis on the smaller
university dataset.
The average number of new infected users resulting from
the simulation exhibits daily (Fig. 2, inset) and weakly oscil-
lations (Fig. 2, main panel), reflecting the daily and weekly
periodicity of human activity patterns. More important, after
ten days the oscillations are superimposed on an exponential
decay, with a decay time about 21 days (see Fig. 1b). The
Poisson process approximation would predict a decay time of
one day, in evident disagreement with the simulations (Fig.
2). In contrast, using the correct inter-event time distribution
for the university dataset we predict a decay time of 25 ± 2
days, in good agreement with the numerical simulations (Fig.
2).
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FIG. 2: Average number of new infections resulting from simula-
tions using the email history of the university dataset (solid line),
using a one day interval binning. The inset shows a zoom of the
initial stages of the spreading process using a one hour interval bin-
ning. The lines correspond to the exponential decay predicted by
the Poisson process approximation (dashed) and the true inter-event
distribution (dot-dashed).
Discussion
The analysis of the university dataset allows us to demon-
strate the connection between the long τ behavior of the inter-
event time distribution P (τ) and the long time decay of the
prevalencen(t). Our main finding is that the prevalence decay
time is given by the characteristic decay time of the inter-event
time distribution. More important, we show that the Poisson
process approximation clearly underestimates the decay time.
This failure is rooted in the fact that the email activity patterns
are characterized by a broad distribution, pushing the decay
time beyond the expected inter-event time. For Poisson pro-
cesses the two time scales, the average interevent time and the
characteristic time of the exponential decay coincide, being
both of the order of one to at most a few days.
Using measurements on the comercial dataset, containing a
larger number of individuals and covering a wider spectrum
of email users, we can extrapolate these conclusions to pre-
dict the behavior of real viruses. Indeed, the university dataset
represents a very small sector of the population with a more
frequent email activity. Yet, given that τE for the commer-
cial dataset is approximatelly nine months, we predict that the
email worm prevalence should decay exponentially with time,
with a decay time about nine months.
This prediction can be tested using the preva-
lence tables reported by the Virus Bulletin web site
(http://www.virusbtn.com), spanning several years. In Fig. 3
we show the number of reported new infections (prevalence)
for six worm outbreaks. In all cases the worm outbreaks
persist for several months, following an exponential decay
with a decay time around twelve months. Our nine month










































FIG. 3: Number new infections reported for six worm outbreaks,
according to Virus Bulletin (www.virusbtn.com). The lines are fit
to an exponential decay resulting in the decay times (measured in
months): LoveLetter (13 ± 2), Ethan (12 ± 1), Marker (14 ± 2),
Class (12± 1), Melissa (13± 1), W32/Ska (11± 1).
the 〈τ〉 ≈ 1 ÷ 4 day prediction based on the Poisson ap-
proximation. The fact that our prediction underestimates the
actual decay time by about three months is probably rooted
in the fact that the commercial dataset, despite its coverage
of an impressive 1.7 million users, still captures only a small
segment (approximatelly 0.1%) of all Internet users.
As we dicussed above, some other factors potentially af-
fecting the spreading of email worms were not considered in
our analysis. First, some users may delete the infected emails
or may have installed the worm antivirus. Since these users
do not participate in the spreading process they are eliminated
from the average number users zd that are found d email con-
tacts away from the first infected user. While this would af-
fect the initial spread characterized by F (t) (10), the expo-
nential decay in (5) and the decay time τ0 = τE in (9) will not
be altered. Second, some email viruses do not use the self-
broadcasting mechanism of email worms. For example, file
viruses require the email user to attach the infected file into
a sent email in order to be transmitted. In turn, only some
email contacts will receive the infected file. Once again, this
affects zd but not the email activity patterns. Therefore, the
prevalence of email viruses in general should decay exponen-
tially in time with a decay time τ0 determined by the decay
time of the inter-event time distribution τE (9). Third, new
5virus strains regularly emerge following small modifications
of earlier viruses. Within this work new virus strains are mod-
eled as new outbreaks. An alternative approach is to analyze
all strains together, modeling the emergence of new strains as
a process of reinfection. In this second approach the dynam-
ics is better described by the susceptible-infected-susceptible
(SIS) model [1]. Earlier work has shown that if reinfections
are allowed in networks with a power law degree distribution,
long prevalence decay times may emerge, which increase with
increasing the network size [1]. The data shown in Fig. 3 rep-
resent, however, the spread of a single virus strain, which is
better captured by the SI model. For the SI model, however,
for a Poisson activity pattern we should get a rapid decay in
prevalence, indicating that the empirically observed long de-
cay times cannot be attributed to this reinfection-based mech-
anism.
A series of recent measurements indicate that power law
inter-event time distributions are not a unique feature of email
communications, but emerge in a wide range of human ac-
tivity patterns, describing the timing of financial transactions
[19, 20], response time of internauts [21], online games [22],
login times into email servers [23] and printing processes [24].
Together they raise the possibility that non-Poisson contact
timing are a common feature of human dynamics and thus
could impact other spreading processes as well. Indeed, mea-
surements indicate that the patterns of visitation of public
places, like libraries [13], or the long range travel patterns of
humans, involving car and air travel, is also driven by fat tailed
inter-event times [25]. Such travel patterns play a key role in
the spread of biological viruses, such as influenza or SARS
[26]. Taken together, these results indicate that the anomalous
decay time predicted and observed for email viruses may in
fact apply more widely, potentially impacting the spread of
biological viruses as well.
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